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Abstract
Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs) are being increasingly used for intelligent transportation
and distribution of materials in warehouses and auto-production lines. In this paper, a prelim-
inary hazard analysis of an AGV’s critical components is conducted by the approach of Failure
Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). To implement this research, a particular AGV
transport system is modelled as a phased mission. Then, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is adopted
to model the causes of phase failure, enabling the probability of success in each phase and hence
mission success to be determined. Through this research, a promising technical approach is es-
tablished, which allows the identification of the critical AGV components and crucial mission
phases of AGVs at the design stage.
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1 Introduction
The concept of an Automated Guided Vehicle (AGV), which travels along a predefined route
without an on-board operator to perform prescribed tasks, was first introduced in 1955 [1].
Nowadays, AGVs are being increasingly used for intelligent transportation and distribution
of materials in warehouses and/or manufacturing facilities attributed to their high efficiency,
safety and low costs. As the AGV systems are getting larger and more complex, increasing
the efficiency and lowering the operation cost of the AGV system has naturally become
the first priorities, via identifying new flow-path layouts and developing advanced traffic
management strategies (e.g. vehicle routing) [2]. For this reason, the previous research effort
in the AGV area has mainly focused on route optimisation and traffic management of AGVs.
For example, Giuseppe established an approach in 2013 to optimise the flow-path such that
the average time for carrying out transportation tasks can be minimised and the utilisation
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degree of AGVs can be maximised at the same time [3]; Wu and Zhou created a simulation
model to avoid collisions, deadlock, blocking and minimise the route distance as well with a
coloured resource-oriented Petri Net [4]. However, little effort has been made to investigate
the safety and reliability issues of the AGV components/subassemblies and their probability
of success in completing a prescribed mission. Although Fazlollahtabar recently created a
model to maximise the total reliability of the AGVs and minimise the repair cost of AGV
systems [5], they considered the AGV as a whole. Hence, fundamental questions, such as
‘How could AGVs fail?’ and ‘What are the possibilities of their failure?’, have not been
answered.To answer these questions, Duran and Zalewski tried to identify the basic failure
modes of the light detection and ranging (LIDAR) system and the camera-based computer
vision system (CV) on AGVs in 2013 by the approach of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) [6]. In that work, human injury, property damage and
vehicle damage were defined as the top events in the fault tree. However, the research did
not cover all components and subassemblies in AGVs. A complete investigation of the safety
and reliability issues of all AGV components and subassemblies is important not only to
ensure the high reliability and availability of AGVs and their success of delivering prescribed
tasks, but also to optimise their maintenance strategies. Research is conducted in this paper
to identify the critical risks of all AGV components and the crucial mission phases in an
AGV operation. Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) will be adopted to achieve this. Hence, the contribution of this paper is in
developing an efficient approach to investigate the reliability of AGVs taking into account
the profiles of the mission undertaken.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the FMECA-FTA
based methodology for AGV safety and reliability analysis is introduced; in Section 3, AGV
risk and reliability analysis procedure is developed; in Section 4, the proposed methodology
is applied to, assess an AGV’s probability of success in completing a prescribed mission,
identify the crucial phases of the mission and key AGV components. The work is finally
concluded in Section 5 with concluding remarks and the plans for future work.
2 Overview of Methods and Application Area
FMECA and FTA are combined in this paper to develop a methodology for the safety and
reliability analysis of an AGV system. To facilitate understanding, a brief introduction to
both techniques is given below.
2.1 Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
FMECA originated from Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)which is a well known
popular technique used for dealing with safety and reliability issues in complex systems, such
as identifying the potential effects that might arise from malfunctions of military, aeronautics
and aerospace systems [7]. FMEA can be also used to implement the analysis of component
failure modes, their resultant effects and secondary influences on both local component
function and the performance of the whole system. A more detailed description of FMEA
can be found in the standard [8]. In engineering practice, FMEA is often implemented at the
early stage of system development such that the critical system components and potential
failures and risks can be identified early.
Conventional FMEA covers the comprehensive analysis of components or subsystem,
failure modes, and failure effects which are local and related to the overall system. FMEA
can be further extended to rank the failure modes according to their probabilities of failure
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and severity classifications based on the available data. That is the so-called Failure Modes
Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), where, ‘criticality’ is a terminology used to reflect
the combined impact of ‘occurrence probability’ and ‘severity’ on the safety and reliability of
the system being inspected.
2.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Through inspecting the logic between the undesired events that could happen in a system
or a mission, FTA allows us to trace back the root cause of a system or mission failure
by using a systematic top-down approach. Moreover, the probability of system or mission
failure can be computed via Boolean algebra from the tree. FTA provides a straightforward
and clear presentation of the logic between various undesired events and is regarded as an
effective, systematic, accurate and predictive method to deal with the safety and reliability
problems in complex systems, such as the safety issues in a nuclear power plant [9]. In terms
of structure, a fault tree is basically composed of various events and gates. In this paper,
three basic types of gates, i.e. AND, OR and NOT, are used to depict the logical relations
between the events that result in the occurrence of a higher level event. A more detailed
description of FTA can be found in [7].
Since FTA ignores the cause of failure modes and FMECA gears towards analysing
individual component failure mode occurrences and moreover it is not quantitative, both
methods are used in combination in this paper.
2.3 Application AGV System
In this paper, to facilitate the research a typical AGV system is chosen for FMECA-FTA
analysis. The AGV system consists of a laser navigation system, safety system, manual
button, batteries, AGV software control system (ASCS), drive unit, brake system, steering
system and attachments. Among these subassemblies, the laser navigation system, developed
by Macleod et al. [10], is in essence a position measurement system to locate the AGV. It
comprises a rotating laser installed on the board of the AGV and three beacons mounted
along the border of the area to be covered. The safety system, with the aid of a laser detection
system installed on the AGV, is designed to avoid obstacles that could appear on the pathway.
These, together with the button, input into the control system. This system will then use
the information to send commands to the drive unit, brake system, steering system and
attachments, where the drive unit, usually a brushless DC electric motor, provides power for
motion and operation. Attachments refer to those additional components that are used to
assist moving and carrying items and batteries, usually the common lead–acid batteries, are
used to supply power to the whole AGV system, see Figure 1.
The AGV that is studied in this paper is required to distribute materials to multiple places
in a warehouse according to different requirements. Each time it receives an order it will
optimise the routes for completing the whole mission first. Then, the AGV will travel to the
material collection port along the optimised route to pick up the materials. After the AGV
is loaded, it will travel to the storage station and unload the materials. After successfully
distributing the materials, the AGV will travel back to its original parking position. Therefore,
the whole mission can be divided into 6 phases in total, namely (1) mission allocation and
route optimisation, (2) dispatch to station, (3) loading of item, (4) travelling to storage,
(5) unloading and finally (6) travelling back to base. The mission can be regarded as successful
only when the AGV is able to operate successfully throughout all these 6 phases without any
break due to component and/or system failures and maintenance. Such a period is named as
a maintenance-free operational period (MFOP) [11].
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Figure 1 AGV system schematic.
Table 1 Severity assessment.
Si Description
1 No loss of any kind
2 Minor property loss (low cost hardware parts), no effect on performance
3 Major property loss, degradation of item functional output
4 Loss of critical hardware, human injuries, severe reduction of functional performance
5 Catastrophic loss of life, loss of the entire AGV system, serious environment damage
3 AGV Risk and Reliability Analysis Procedure
Applying the FMECA process requires the identification of the failure modes of all components
in the AGV system, assessment of their local and system effects, evaluation of the severities
of their consequences, and carrying out the analysis of their failure rates. The end outcome
is the identification of a number of critical components in the AGV system based on the
following risk priority number (RPN), i.e.
RPN i = Si × Fi ×Di (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) (1)
where N refers to the total number of failure modes of the AGV components being considered;
Si, Fi and Di are the severity level, failure frequency and detectability of the failure of the
i-th failure mode, respectively. In principle, the larger the value of RPN, the more critical
(or important) the corresponding failure mode of the AGV component tends to be. In the
calculation, the severity level Si is assessed using the method depicted in Table 1. The
failure frequency Fi is assessed based on the ranges listed in Table 2. The detectability Di is
assessed based on the information described in Table 3.
Once the critical components and their failure modes in the AGV system are identified
by using the aforementioned FMECA method, the logical relations of the failure events of
these identified critical AGV components will be investigated by the approach of FTA. The
resultant fault tree can be constructed by using the following method:
(1) three basic logical gates, i.e. AND, OR and NOT, are used to depict the logical relations
between the failure events that result in the occurrence of a higher level event;
(2) mission failure is used as the top event in the fault tree;
(3) phase failures and component/subsystem failures are used as the intermediate events;
(4) the various failure modes that lead to intermediate events are the fundamental events in
the fault tree.
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Table 2 Failure frequency assessment.
Failure frequency Fi Range
1 < 0.01 failures/ year
2 0.01-0.1 failures/year
3 0.1-0.5 failures/year
4 0.5-1 failures/year
5 >1 failures/year
Table 3 Detectability assessment.
Detectability Di Description
1 Almost certain to detect
2 Good chance of detecting
3 May not detect
4 Unlikely to detect
5 Very unlikely to detect
Table 4 Assumed phase lengths.
Phase 1 2 3 4 5 6
Phase Length (minutes) 1.2 12 1.2 9 1.2 6
Herein, it is necessary to note that the following two basic assumptions are presumed in the
modelling process in order to simplify the topology structure of the fault tree and therefore
model calculations:
(1) the AGV is presumed not to be assigned another mission after unloading; and
(2) the interactions between multiple AGVs, such as AGVs collision and deadlock, are
neglected.
Once the fault tree is obtained, the phase unreliability, the failure probability of each AGV
subsystem during the period of completing a prescribed mission, and the probability that
the AGV is able to complete the whole mission, can be calculated through performing FTA.
Hence, the safety, reliability and availability of the AGV system can be readily obtained.
4 Validation of the proposed methodology
In order to validate the methodology proposed in Section 3, the method is applied to identify
the key AGV components (by FMECA), crucial phases of mission (by FTA), and assess the
AGV’s probability of success in completing a prescribed mission (by FTA).
To implement FMECA and FTA, the length (i.e. time duration) of each phase identified
in Section 2.3, is prescribed a value as shown in Table 4. The total time duration to complete
the whole mission is 30.6 minutes. It is worth noting that the data presented in Table 4 is
empirical data, only for demonstration purpose. In reality, these would be different when the
AGV implements different types of missions.
A list of the different failure modes of all the components of the AGV of interest are given
in Table 5, in which the corresponding severity, failure rate, and detectability are included.
The data in the table is based on [12] and expert knowledge and further developed for the
AGV. The failure frequencies are given in number of failures per year. The resultant RPN
can be determined from equation (1) and hence the criticality of each event failure mode can
be ranked.
In the RPN calculation, the failure frequency Fi of each failure mode is derived first
from the failure rate listed in Table 5 and the ranges described in Table 2. In table 5, the
description of the component function, local and system effects and criticality ranking is not
included due to limited space. Once the RPN of a failure mode is obtained, its criticality
can be ranked.
From the FMECA results shown in Table 5, it can be found that the manual button has
the smallest RPN and hence the lowest rank of criticality. Thus, it will not be regarded
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Table 5 FMECA of AGV.
Identity Sub-item Failure Mode Si F Rate(f/y) Di RPN
Drive Unit Unit fails 3 1 1 12
Circuit connection fails 3 0.5 3 27
ASCS Control system fails 3 2 4 60
Control system malfunction 4 4 5 100
LNS
GPS Fail to locate AGV 3 0.25 4 36
Transmitter Disabled communication 3 0.25 4 36
Laser emitter Unit fails 3 0.25 4 36
Laser sensor Unit fails 2 0.125 4 24
Safety Systems Laser emitter Unit fails 3 0.25 4 36
Laser sensor Unit fails 4 0.125 4 48
Attachments Transfer part Worn, fatigue, Looseness 4 1 2 32
Holding part Worn, fatigue, Looseness 4 1 2 32
Batteries
Performance degeneration 2 1 3 24
Leakage 5 0.125 2 30
Overheat 5 0.125 1 15
Brake System Brake shoe Worn out; Looseness 4 0.2 2 24
Steering System Unit Fails 3 0.25 4 36
Manual button Button is stuck 2 0.05 2 8
as key component of the AGV in the process of fault tree construction. Accordingly, for
simplicity the fault tree of the AGV is built by only considering those identified key AGV
components and the phases that they are involved in, i.e. drive unit, ASCS, laser navigation
system, safety system, attachments, batteries, brake system, and steering system.
The construction of fault trees for phased missions is started by identifying the logic of
different phases and their effects on the success of mission. Thus, ‘mission failure’ is chosen
as the top event, and the 6 phases defined in Section 2.3 are used as intermediate event below
this. The logic between the top event and these branch events is shown in Figure 2. The
fault tree is further developed in order to investigate the logic between every phase mission
and the failure modes of related AGV components. The resultant fault tree for Phase 2 is
shown in Figure 3 as example.
From Figure 3, it is seen that the failure during the phase is used as the top event, the
failures of those AGV components that are involved in the phase are basic events. The
failures of mechanical parts, system parts for navigation, control and safety, and the power
supply are the intermediate events. For example, in Phase 2, the AGV will travel from its
parking position to the material collection port. During this period, the ASCS will control
the AGV to travel along the optimised route; the laser navigation system (LNS) works over
the whole course of the phase to locate the AGV as it moves; the motor is required to drive
the vehicle; steering system enables vehicle turning; the safety system performs obstacle scan;
and the brake system is responsible to slow down the vehicle when turning and stop the
vehicle to avoid collisions. Obviously, the success of phase 2 mission relies on all of these
subassemblies working. The fault of anyone of them can lead to the failure of phase 2. In
addition, phase 2 can be started only after phase 1 has been completed successfully. In other
words, the mission failure in phase j+1 is the combined result of successful phases 1 to j and
the system failure occurring in phase j + 1 via an ‘AND’ gate. This can be seen in Figure 3
where the ‘NOT’ gate is used to represent system success during phase 1 as NOT failure in
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Figure 2 Logic between the top mishap and branch events.
Table 6 Component failures causing system failure at each phase
Phase Component failures causing system failure at each phase
1 ASCS; LNS; Batteries
2 Drive unit; Brake system; Steering system; ASCS; LNS; Safety system; batteries
3 Attachments; Brake system; ASCS; Safety system; Batteries;
4 Drive unit; ASCS; LNS; Safety system;
Attachments; Batteries; Brake system; Steering system
5 Attachments; Brake system; ASCS; Safety system; Batteries
6 Drive unit; ASCS; LNS; Safety system; Batteries; Brake system; Steering system
phase 1. Following this logic, the AGV operation is analysed at each phase. The component
failures resulting in the system failure at different phases are identified as shown in Table 6.
Furthermore, in order to complete the FTA, the fault trees for all the identified critical
AGV subsystems are further constructed. The corresponding fault trees for the drive unit
and the ASCS are shown in Figure 4 as examples.
As a systemic FTA method has been developed in [13] dedicated to modelling phased
mission with MFOP, that method is used in this paper to calculate the mission reliability
and phased unreliability of the AGV within MFOP based on the phase lengths assumed in
Table 4 and the FMECA information obtained in Table 5. The details of the calculation
method are given below.
Firstly, the system failure in phase j, i.e. Tj , is calculated by using the following equation
Tj = (Phase 1 to j − 1 Success).(Phase j Failure) (2)
The probability of failure of basic event A in all phases from i to j (i.e. qAi,j ) can be
calculated using the equation
qAi,j = e−λAti−1 − e−λAtj (3)
where λA refers to the failure rate of a basic event A, tj is the length of phase j.
The unreliability of phase j can be calculated by
Qj = 1−Rj = 1−R1,j/R1,j−1 (4)
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Figure 3 Fault trees for Phase 2.
Table 7 Component failure probability at the end of whole mission.
Description Failure Probability Description Failure Probability
ASCS 0.00034925 LNS 0.00005094
Attachments 0.00009360 Safety Systems 0.00002183
Drive Unit 0.00008725 Steering System 0.00001455
Batteries 0.00007277 Brake System 0.00001164
where Rj denotes the success probability of phase j , R1,j is the success probability till the
end of phase j. It should be noticed that the probability of failure is calculated using the
exponential distribution since the failure rates are assumed to be constant for simplicity.
In the FTA calculation, the component will be taken into account in a phase only when
it is involved in the completion of that phase. It will not be considered if it contributes
nothing to the phase. Applying the aforementioned method to calculate the component
failure probability, mission reliability, and phased unreliability of the AGV within MFOP,
the results are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
From the results shown in Table 7, it is seen that the ASCS, attachments, drive unit and
battery have the largest failure probability at the end of the whole mission. That implies
these four components are most vulnerable to failure.
From Table 8, it is found that the mission reliability at the end of the 6th phase is
0.99930, which is based on the success of all six phases. This means that the AGV has a
greater than 99% chance of successfully completing the mission. Thus, it in fact indicates
the overall reliability of the AGV in accomplishing the whole mission. For this reason, it can
be concluded that the AGV considered here is a very reliable material distribution vehicle in
the warehouse. In addition, Table 8 shows that phase 2 ‘dispatch to station’ and phase 4
‘travelling to storage” show the largest phase unreliability values. This means that the AGV
is more likely to fail in the completion of these two phases.
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Figure 4 Fault trees for Drive Unit and ASCS.
Table 8 The resultant mission reliability and phase unreliability.
Phase Mission reliability at phase end Phase unreliability
1 0.99998 0.00001855
2 0.99974 0.00024386
3 0.99967 0.00007266
4 0.99945 0.00021915
5 0.99942 0.00002243
6 0.99930 0.00012527
Additionally, in this paper the optimum maintenance time of the AGV is also considered
by investigating the reliability of the AGV against the number of the missions that the AGV
can complete without maintenance. The success probability of the AGV can be calculated
by
SuccessProbability =
n∏
i=1
Pi (5)
where Pi is the probability that the AGV is able to complete the ith mission successfully,
and n is the number of missions the AGV needs to complete. The calculation results are
shown in Figure 5. From Figure 5, it is interestingly found that with the increase of the
number of missions that the AGV can complete without receiving any maintenance, the
success probability shows a monotonous decreasing tendency, thus from which the optimum
maintenance time of the AGV can be readily inferred.
5 Conclusions
In order to investigate the safety and reliability issues existing in AGVs that are being
increasingly used for intelligent transportation and material distribution in warehouses
and/or manufacturing facilities, a promising technical approach has been established in this
paper. It has been shown that FMECA and FTA can be adopted to identify the critical
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Figure 5 Success probability vs. mission number.
AGV components and the crucial mission phases of AGVs at the design stage. From the
research reported, the following conclusions can be reached:
(1) The key AGV components can be successfully identified based on the criticality rank
that is obtained through performing FMECA. The calculation results presented in this
paper has shown that nearly all AGV components except manual button, such as driving,
operating, control and power supply units, are critical components;
(2) The FTA results show that among all identified key components, the ASCS, attachments,
drive unit and battery are most vulnerable components to failure because they are found
to have the largest failure probability at the end of whole mission;
(3) The FTA calculation has suggested that the AGV is more likely to fail in the completion
of the phase ‘dispatch to station’ and the phase ‘travelling to storage’ because these
two phases show the largest phase unreliability values. But it is worth noting that such
conclusions are based on the assumptions given in Section 3. In reality, the result would
be different, depending on the real reliability data collected from the AGVs;
(4) Research has shown that the AGV being inspected is overall a very reliable material
distribution vehicle in the warehouse. But Figure 5 has indicated that the reliability of
the AGV will degenerate if it completes more missions without maintenance;
(5) Through this research, it can be concluded that the proposed FMECA-FTA approach is
indeed a valid method for assessing and evaluating the safety and reliability issues in
AGVs.
Nevertheless, the work reported in this paper is only a preliminary research on AGV reliability
issues. In the future, the proposed method will be further validated by using real AGV data
through the collaboration with relevant industry partners.
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